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Zoning, Taking, and Dealing: The
Problems and Promise of Bargaining
in Land Use Planning Conflicts
Erin Ryant
"Dealing'' [in land use conflicts] has a number of potential
benefits. It allows for individualized decisions that take into account the unique features of a particular parcel or project and
the availability of measures capable of mitigating adverse land
use effects. A carefully tailored set of land use requirements
based on a bargaining process may be fairer than traditional
regulation: rather than simply treating roughly similar land
equally, it takes into account specific characteristics and
problems that justify variations from a potentially overbroad
norm. Furthermore, the bargaining process may be more efficient because it facilitates cost-efficient outcomes and substitutes a potentially cheaper decision-making process that fosters
prompt and amicable compromises while avoiding the costs attendant to protracted administrative and judicial appeals.
Yet dealing is not without its perils. Unfair or inefficient
outcomes may result from imbalances in power or skill that either distort the dealings of participating parties or result in failures to consider the interests of affected nonparticipants. In
extreme cases involving government parties, power imbalance
may result in the creation of "naked preferences," that is, the
treatment of one group or person different from another solely
because of a raw exercise of political power in the absence of a
broader and more general justification or public value. 1

t Law Clerk, The Honorable James R. Browning, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit; J.D., 2001, Harvard Law School; M.A., 1994, Wesleyan
University; B.A., 1991, Harvard University. This article is the product of a fellowship
with the Harvard Negotiation Research Project through a generous grant from the
Hewlett Foundation. I would like to thank Bob Mnookin, Jerold Kayden, and especially Bob Bordone for their support of this project. Thanks also to the members of
the Harvard Negotiation Law Review who helped prepare this article for publication.
1. Judith Welch Wegner, Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical Foundations of Government Land
Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REv. 957, 960 (1987).
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INTRODUCTION

Municipal land use bargaining may imply as many problems as
it heralds promise, but it is widely acknowledged as the universal
language of land use planning. Planners and scholars agree that
public-private negotiation plays a central role in the vast majority of
local land use decision-making. 2
At least in part, this is a result of the peculiar attributes of the
resource at issue. Land is, perhaps, the ultimate nonfungible. Landforms and land values are forever in flux-at the mercy of both natural cycles that erode and accrete and economic changes that render a
given parcel more or less valuable in relation to external factors.
Each parcel of land possesses unique characteristics not only in its
physical attributes, but also by virtue of its location, and its proximity to other unique parcels. Unlike almost every other thing of value,
it is impossible to relocate spatially. Rules of general application fit
poorly to so variegated and unstable a resource.
Moreover, land uses implicate the conflicting strands of property
rights far more profoundly than do uses of personalty, since free disposition of one's own land extends perilously into the realm of neighbors' quiet enjoyment of their own. Although private rights in
property ownership are a foundational value of our legal system, private rights in land use are considerably more constrained. County
and municipal governments designate the outer limits within which
landowners may freely exploit their property without unduly burdening the surrounding community. 3 Zoning, by which a community
segregates incompatible land uses, is the primary mechanism. 4
The continuing contest of public and private interests in land use
is, without exaggeration, epic. Police power-based zoning ordinances
exist to protect public health and welfare, while takings limitations
exist to protect property owners from government abuse. 5 But in the
clash of these competing values lies the classic opportunity for negotiation to resolve disputes, and even to create unexpected value in creatively tailored outcomes. 6 Public and private parties to land use
2. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Policing Bias and Conflicts of Interest in Zoning
Decisionmaking, 65 N.D. L. REv. 161, 164 (1989).
3. See infra text accompanying notes 43-49.
4. Nicolas M. Kublicki, Land Use By, For, and Of the People: Problems with the
Application of Initiatives and Referenda to the Zoning Process, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 99,
106 (1991) ("Zoning is the process whereby municipalities minimize the incompatibilities between different land uses.")
5. See infra text accompanying notes 14-18.
6. See generally RoBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO
CREATE VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2000).
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disputes have been drawn to the bargaining model in the timehonored search for mutually agreeable solutions based on beneficial
exchange. And in the absence of substantive agreement on where
private must yield to public interests (and vice versa), negotiated
decisionmaking also provides a deliberative means of pursuing just
ends.
Nevertheless, constitutive rules are needed to mark the outer
boundaries of permissible bargaining to avoid outcomes overly solicitous of either public or private interests. The doctrines of reserved
powers and unconstitutional conditions provide important constraints against state abuses, curbing government abdication of public responsibilities and exploitation of private individuals,
respectively. 7 The Supreme Court has entered the fray by establishing additional constraints through its takings jurisprudence. Concerned that planning practices had leaned too far in favor of public
interests in land use, the Court has used several recent takings cases
to voice protections for landowners in disputes with local government.8 However, these new rules make value-creating negotiation9
nearly impossible in land use conflicts, a result that arguably leaves
all parties "worse off' than before.
This article explores the phenomenon of negotiation-based decisionmaking in local land use conflicts and questions the value of constraints created by the Supreme Court's new takings jurisprudence.
Ultimately, it proposes a return to a bargain-based environment according to a mediation model, in which abuses are constrained
through procedural attention to the meaningful representation of all
interests at the negotiating table.
Part II reviews the general practice of land use planning and
analyzes the land use dispute as a site of contest between public and
private interests. Part III explores how the bargain-based model has
assumed prominence among local land planning agencies seeking the
uncertain equipoise between public and private interests. Part IV
discusses the response of the Supreme Court via its takings jurisprudence, and Part V reviews evidence of the actual impact of the takings decisions on local planning practice. Part VI analyzes the
7. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 111-28.
9. In value-creating negotiation, parties explore their broad interests and craft a
resolution around trades that optimize the benefits yielded to all. This enables them
to "expand the pie" of contested value before dividing it among the disputants. See
generally MNOOKIN ET AL., supra note 6.
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problematic anti-bargaining implications of the new takings decisions, and Part VII recommends a return to bargain-based models,
constrained by a theory of representation that would counter the reserved powers critique of municipal bargaining.

II.

THE CoNCOMITANT NATURE OF PuBLIC AND
PRIVATE INTERESTS IN LAND UsE

The fundamental conflict that drives takings, zoning, and indeed
most land management disputes is the perpetual tension between
public and private interests in land use. This tension has been recognized at common law since the time of the Justinian Code, 10 and constitutionally since ratification of the Bill of Rights. 11 While private
ownership of real property is a bedrock principle in the liberal tradition, 12 a frequently overlooked but critical distinction exists between
land ownership and land use: though the former is accepted to be an
inherently private phenomenon, the latter is not. This is demonstrated by the subjugation of private land use to the sovereignty of
the public police power, from which has evolved modern regional
planning and zoning.
Land Use and the Police Power. Municipal 13 land use disputes
arise in light of the vexing intersection between constitutionally protected private property rights in land and constitutionally designated
responsibilities for land use management by the state. Whereas the
Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution makes clear that "private
property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,"14 the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states all powers not
explicitly delegated to the national government. 15 These include the
traditional "police power" of the state to legislate for the protection of
10. See Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
477, 478 (2001) (discussing the jus publicum of ancient Rome, which protected public
rights of access to navigable waterways regardless of ownership).
11. The Fifth and Tenth Amendments contemplate both public and private interests in land use. See infra text accompanying notes 14-16.
12. See JoHN LocKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GoVERNMENT 21-28 (1690) (Macpherson, ed. 1980).
13. Local govemments involved in land use disputes include county, city, town,
and village govemments. For simplicity, I use the word "municipal" to refer to all
local govemments below the state level.
14. U.S. CoNST. amend. V.
15. U.S. CoNST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.")
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the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare, 16 which has
long been invoked in the resolution of land use disputes. 17 In 1876,
the Supreme Court affirmed that although the state may not control
rights that are exclusively private, it may require "each citizen to so
conduct himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to
injure another," 18 signifying the paradoxical nature of property ownership as a private right that necessarily implicates public
responsibilities.
Today, local governments vigorously wield the police power to
protect various public interests in land use. Regional planning
designates the limits within which landowners may freely exploit
their property without unduly burdening their surrounding community. But given the contest between public and private interests at
issue in land use, private property rights in land have never been
absolute. Common law private and public nuisance doctrines have
recognized state-enforceable limitations on private property rights
where their exercise would produce harmful externalities. 19 Private
parties have also used covenants and equitable servitudes to enforce
land use restrictions on particular parcels. 20
Even before the rise of twentieth century zoning laws, many municipalities adopted local building and land use restrictions to protect
public welfare and preempt incompatible uses. As early as 1838,
Michigan law authorized municipalities to "assign certain places for
the exercising of any trade or employment offensive to the inhabitants,"21 and Boston imposed separate building height limitations in
16. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387, 390 (1926)
(discussing the traditional scope of the state's police power and establishing the constitutionality of zoning as incidental thereto). The police power, though originating in
common law, is explicitly conferred by most state constitutions as well. DANIEL POL·
LAK, HAVE THE U.S. SuPREME CouRT's 5TH AMENDMENT TAKINGS DECISIONS CHANGED
LAND UsE PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA? 3 (California Research Bureau, CRB-00-004)
(2000) (discussing the origins of the police power in California).
17. See, e.g., Village of Euclid, supra note 16, at 387 (invoking the police power as
a legitimate means of settling land use disputes). Highlighting the peculiarly public
nature of land use disputes, a duet of judges has observed that "[s]ettlement of land
use controversies, unlike most private disputes, may have a substantial impact on
nearby properties and the general welfare of the public at large." Hon. Richard S.
Cohen, Hon. Douglas K. Wolfson & Kathleen Meehan DalCortivo, Settling Land Use
Litigation While Protecting the Public Interest: Whose Lawsuit is This Anyway?, 23
SETON HALL L. REv. 844, 844 (1993).
18. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876).
19. See RoBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAw, SciENCE,
AND POLICY 87-88 (3d ed. 2000).
20. Kublicki, supra note 4, at 107.
21. Mich. Rev. Stat. 171 (1838), cited in RoBERT C. ELLICKSON & VIcKI L. BEEN,
LAND UsE CoNTROLs: CASEs AND MATERIALS 87 (2d ed. 2000).
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residential and commercial areas to minimize fire hazards. 22 State
courts routinely enforced local ordinances barring noxious uses in
protected neighborhoods, including the slaughter of cattle, 23 the
maintenance of commercial laundries, 24 and the selling of alcohol. 25
In 1899, Washington, D.C. restricted building heights to preserve the
prominence of the U.S. Capitol's dome.26
The Rise of Regional Planning. The precursor to modern zoning
first appeared in Europe in 1891 when the German city of Frankfurt
implemented a comprehensive plan that divided the city into different districts with varying building and use restrictions tailored to intended area uses. 27 Los Angeles followed in 1909 with a city plan
that designated one residential and seven industrial districts. 28 In
1916, the rapid rise of American zoning was triggered by New York
City's adoption of an ordinance designed to curb the increasing traffic
congestion and decreasing light and air associated with proliferating
skyscrapers, and to limit the incursion of sweatshop factories into the
posh Fifth Avenue commercial district. 29 The successful implementation of the New York plan helped inspire promulgation of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act30 by the U.S. Department of
Commerce in 1922, which provided a statutory model by which states
might delegate zoning authority to local governments.
In 1926, in the landmark Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 31
case, the Supreme Court formally recognized municipal zoning regulations as constitutionally incident to the police power when enacted
pursuant to validly implemented land use plans that advance a legitimate public interest.3 2 Zoning spread rapidly to municipalities both
large and small, most of which followed the Euclid model of strict
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Cronin v. New York, 82 N.Y. 318, 323 (1880).
24. In re Hang Kie, 10 P. 327, 328 (Cal. 1886).
25. Shea v. City of Muncie, 46 N.E. 138 (Ind. 1897).
26. ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 87.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 86-88. Notably, the ordinance was lobbied past city-wide apathy by
three separate interest groups: Fifth Avenue merchants concerned with avoiding income losses associated with erosion of neighborhood glamour, real estate owners concerned with depression of property values near skyscrapers, and "reformers
interested in broader concepts of city planning." Id at 88.
30. U.S. Department of Commerce, Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (1926),
reprinted in ALAN C. WEINSTEIN, ANDERSON's AMERICAN LAw OF ZoNING, vol. 5 (4th
ed. 1997).
31. 272 u.s. 365 (1926).
32. Id. at 387, 390, 395-96.
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segregation between residential and commercial uses. 33 (It has been
noted, however, that the mass-production of the Euclid model arose
not because of an inherent superiority, but rather because the model
had withstood constitutional scrutiny by the Supreme Court. 34 ) In
the 1950s, the federal government encouraged regional planning
through urban-renewal grants to municipalities implementing "workable programs for community improvement," often signified by
comprehensive zoning plans. 35 In 1991, the federal government conditioned certain federal transportation funding on metropolitan-wide
transportation planning.36
Presently, all fifty states have enacted laws that enable (and
many that require 37 ) municipalities to regulate land use via comprehensive plans designed to yield benefits considered otherwise unascertainable in light of cost externalization and collective action
problems. 38 Houston, Texas is currently the only major U.S. city that
does not regulate land use by zoning.3 9
As zoning assumed status as the dominant form ofland use planning by localities, the public interest in private land use was recognized more explicitly. As one scholar has noted:
Zoning splits property rights between the individual landowners
and the local government by vesting a set of collective property
rights in the community. These collective property rights allow
the community some degree of control over the landowner's use
ofher own land. While traditional notions of nuisance grant the
community some power to limit land use, zoning shifts certain
additional property rights from the landowner to the community. Thus, under current zoning law, the community's interest
in maintaining a particular atmosphere or growth pattern is
protected by a property rule. A landowner cannot simply choose
to violate a land use regulation and pay for the damage caused,
33. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 375 (observing that most jurisdictions hewed closely to the predominant model of zoning following Euclid, yielding "remarkably consistent, and boring, 'cookie-cutter' development pattern[s].~').
34. See CHARLES DoNAHUE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PROPERTY: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT AND THE INSTITUTION (3d ed. 1993). Increasing advocacy for mixed-use development plans suggests that the Euclid model of strict segregation may not be inherently superior after all.
35. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 61.
36. 23 U.S.C.A. §134 (2001) (codifying a section of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991).
37. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 67-68.
38. See, e.g., ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 41, 59.
39. Jane E. Larson, Informality, Illegality, and Inequality, 20 YALE L. & PoL'Y
REv. 137, 147 n.44 (2002).
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as she could under a liability rule, but instead must obtain permission from the community before proceeding with any nonconforming use. As long as the land use regulation furthers a
legitimate government interest, the community can refuse to
grant this permission.40
Even as takings jurisprudence reveals a shift in the judicially recognized balance between private and public interests in land use, courts
have not questioned their essentially bicameral nature, and zoning
has received general acceptance as a useful tool for protecting public
interests. However, some critics question whether these benefits
truly accrue to the community at large, arguing that zoning seeks
primarily to protect property values and generally furthers the interests of powerful members of society at the expense of those with
less. 41

The Mechanisms of Zoning. Ideally, the public interest in land
use is effectively channeled through the zoning process, which delineates collective land use choices and affords property holders boundaries within which to freely exercise private interests. Zoning operates
primarily by segregati!lg conflicting uses within a jurisdiction among
designated districts. 42 The process involves a regulatory two-step:
promulgation of a comprehensive plan and the pursuant issuance of
local zoning ordinances.
Generally, a county or municipality first formulates the comprehensive plan, 43 which articulates a general rationale and specifies
benefits the locality seeks to enable through planning. Common
objectives include the encouragement of appropriate statewide land
use; the provision of adequate air, light and open space; the control of
population densities; and the provision of a variety of land uses in
order to meet the needs of all citizens. 44 The comprehensive plan
may be compared to a set of community blueprints, designating the
specific-use districts into which all jurisdictional territories are to be
divided.
40. Lee Anne Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IowA L. REv. 1, 16-17 (2000).
41. See, e.g., John F. MacDonald, Houston Remains Unzoned, 71 LAND EcoN.
137, 140 (1995) (suggesting that "the demand for zoning arises from its use as a device
for excluding lower-income people from certain areas").
42. Cordes, supra note 2, at 164; Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106 ("Zoning is the
process whereby municipalities minimize the incompatibilities between different land
uses.").
43. The comprehensive plan is sometimes referred to as the "general plan."
44. Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 846.
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Local zoning ordinances are then crafted to implement the details of the plan within the specified districts. 45 In a zoned locality,
each parcel of land is governed by the applicable zoning ordinance,
which may dictate restrictions relating to permissible uses (i.e., commercial, light industrial, heavy industrial, single-family residential,
multi-unit residential, etc.), building height, density, architectural
style, rent control statutes, open space preservation, environmental
protections, or any other regulations that would permissibly advance
the goals of the comprehensive plan. 46 To withstand constitutional
scrutiny, a zoning regulation must yield a legitimate public benefit
without unduly burdening any individual citizen, 47 and its enactment must afford due process to directly affected parties. 48
Zoning ordinances often require that landowners seek permission from the zoning authority to ensure that any significant changes
are consistent with the comprehensive plan. Thus, a landowner may
require a subdivision approval before dividing a given parcel for development, or a building permit before initiating new construction.
Also, the zoning model anticipates the need to provide greater flexibility within the confines of the comprehensive plan after its adoption. Mechanisms for adjustment include the issuance of variances
and special use permits, allowing straightforward exceptions to the
zoning ordinance; conditional use permits, allowing exceptions on
condition of the applicant's performance of remedial obligations; and
exactions, which require that developers provide or finance some public amenity in exchange for receiving a use permission that the government could otherwise withhold. 49 According to these requests for
rezoning, the zoning authority might seek alteration of the ordinance
to allow the proposed use.
The Special Case of Regulatory Exactions. Exactions, by which a
municipality conditions a permit for a land use that would compromise some public good on the developer's agreement to provide an
45. See Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106. For a general exposition of the zoning
process, see, for example, Kublicki, supra note 4, at 106-14.
46. See, e.g., PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 4.
47. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 185 (1928) (holding that legitimate zoning regulations must bear a substantial relation to the public welfare and
not overly burden any individual citizen).
48. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(requiring the balancing of legitimate state interests against individual due process
rights).
49. See, e.g., PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 4 (discussing the basic tools of zoning);
Vicki Been, "Exit" As a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 473,474 (1991) (discussing exactions in
particular).
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offsetting public benefit, represent the most significant bargaining
mechanism in the local land use planning arena. Professor Vicki
Been explains that "exactions are an outgrowth of the centuries-old
practice of levying 'special assessments' upon real property to pay for
public improvements, such as paved streets, that provide a direct and
special benefit to the property."50 Special assessments were generally levied after the improvements were installed, but after widespread assessment delinquency during the Great Depression left
many municipalities unable to recoup the costs of public infrastructure, mechanisms were sought to shift the initial costs of public improvements (and the correlating risk of failure) to private
developers. 51 Communities initially required construction of on-site
dedications of land for public streets and utilities, but gradually
sought dedications for public schools, police and fire stations, and
park space. 52 When lands within a subdivision were poorly suited for
the public needs generated by the development, municipalities began
to seek off-site dedications, or fees-in-lieu-of-dedication if the developer preferred to contribute funds toward public goods rather than
providing them outright.53
Ultimately, communities sought to internalize the costs of development by imposing impact fees, which assess developers for the costs
of municipal services generated, and linkage requirements, a hybrid
of impact fees and off-site dedications. As described by Professor
Been,
Linkage programs condition approval of certain central city developments (usually commercial or office space) upon the developer's provision of facilities or services for which the
development will create a need, or that development will displace. These programs have been adopted in a variety of cities
for such needs as low-income housing, mass-transit facilities,
day-care services, and job-training and employment
opportunities. 54

Set-asides and inclusionary zoning are species of linkage programs
that address the need for low-income housing generated by new development by requiring a developer to make a certain percentage of
development units affordable to low- or moderate-income residents
(or to pay in-lieu-of fees to an affordable housing fund). 55
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Been,
ld.
ld. at
ld. at
Id. at
ld. at

supra note 49, at 479.
480.
480.
480-81.
481.
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Some observers view the exaction mechanisms as creative means
of mitigating the negative externalities associated with uncontrolled
development, 56 but others view them as illegitimate government
overreaching. 57 These scholars fear that unconstrained municipal
discretion to trade building entitlements for desired goods represents
a betrayal of the fundamental purposes and effectiveness of regional
planning. 58 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested that certain
instances of such bargaining may constitute illegal extortion. 59
Nonetheless, the varieties and complexities of exaction devices
demonstrate the sophistication with which municipal planners have
learned to approach the problem of appropriately allocating the costs
and benefits associated with development between the private and
public parties of interest.

III.

BARGAINING AS A RESPONSE TO THE ELUSIVE
PuBLIC-PRIVATE BALANCE

Despite acknowledgement of the concomitant public and private
interests in land use, the confounding problem of trying to reach the
appropriate balance between them represents the essential struggle
of the land use planning project. Seeking this elusive equipoise, local
planning agencies nationwide have adopted practices that enable
them to weigh the application of formalized rules against the unique
circumstances of each proposed land use. Some scholars view this as
a backwards devolution from organized planning to ad hoc case-bycase adjudication. 60 Others view it as the most fair and efficient response to a project that defies rigid rule-application due to the uniqueness of land parcels, proposed uses, and municipal development
56. Id. at 482.
57. Cf. Fennell, supra note 40, at 26 ("the fact that a community is willing to sell
the right to violate a given regulation provides a strong indication that the regulation
does not constitute a true exercise of the police power").
58. See Jerold Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 3, 7, 47 (1991) (arguing that exaction bargaining unconstrained by nexus and
proportionality serve to undermine and delegitimize the zoning enterprise); Jonathan
M. Davidson et al., "Where's Dolan?": Exaction Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAw. 683, 693
(1998) ("Such a waivable policy induces skepticism about the reality of the suggested
public purposes supposedly being advanced by the ordinance.").
59. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (noting that the absence of
nexus in the context of a regulatory exaction "converted a valid regulation of use into
an out-and-out plan of extortion").
60. See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 17.
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priorities. 61 In any event, most agree that today, the raw material of
most land use planning is the process of negotiation. 62
Fortuitously, the choice of a bargaining model, even if rendered
unintentionally, represents a highly rational strategy for pursuing
the public good under conditions of substantive uncertainty about its
content. As Professor Carrie Menkel-Meadow has observed, "[a]s
many social and political theorists have abandoned any hope of
agreeing in advance on the common good, procedural ideals of issue
by issue deliberation and negotiation have supplanted substantive
conceptions of the common good."63 In the absence of a surer sense of
where to strike the public-private balance, the negotiating table offers a route to-if not the correct answer-at least a workable local
consensus.
Zoning as Dealmaking. Early zoning theory anticipated that
land use decisions would primarily occur through the initial allocation of uses by the comprehensive plan and implementing ordinances,
with only minor adjustments over time afforded by variances. 64
However, nearly a century of zoning experience indicates a very different practice. Planning professionals agree that despite the overall
boundaries established by a regional plan, zoning plans exist in perpetual flux. 65 As Professor Robert Ellickson notes,
[b]y around 1980, virtually all planning professionals had come
to realize the limits of rationality and the unpredictability of
modern civilization. They thus developed something of a consensus that plans should concentrate on influencing short-term
and middle-term events. This meant that the planning period
should not stretch beyond 25 years (at the very most), and that
any detailed planning should concentrate on what would unfold
during the next five years or so. Most planners also came to
believe that plans should be continually revised to take account
of new information and events. In sum, flexible, middle-range
planning has come to replace long-range, end-state planning. 66

61. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 4.
62. See, e.g., id. at 26-27; Cordes, supra note 2, at 166-67; Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL.
L. REv. 837, 849 (1983).
63. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyers' Role(s) in Deliberative Democracy 9
(forthcoming).
64. Cordes, supra note 2, at 166.
65. Cf ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 61.
66. !d.
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The significant result ofthis constant flow of new municipal priorities
and development opportunities is that the actual practice of land use
decisionmaking has grown increasingly discretionary.
Indeed, current practices demonstrate that land use decisionmaking has shifted significantly from the planned toward the particularized, affording a more ad hoc response to individual development
proposals. Professor Mark Cordes has observed:
It is now widely recognized that current zoning practice little
resembles [the early] notion of planned development, but instead places an emphasis on flexibility and change though the
use of variances, special use permits, and rezoning. In particular, these devices are often used to delay concrete decisions as a
response to an actual development proposal. For example, municipalities often subject numerous uses within a particular district to the special-use process, frequently providing only very
generalized standards for issuance of a permit. This in effect
provides municipalities with significant flexibility and discretion in responding to particular proposals .... Under this approach rezoning decisions are basically used to make
particularized decisions regarding the suitability of a proposed
use and thus in effect administer land development on a caseby-case basis. 67

Like Ellickson, Cordes posits that this shift from planned to particularized decisionmaking in local land use matters is
partially attributable to the inadequacies of traditional planning theory in a fluid society. Static end-state zoning is necessarily speculative in nature and thus at best can only
approximate possible development needs and patterns. By in
effect delaying determinations of actual uses until concrete proposals are made, municipalities can assess the potential impact
of uses in a concrete situation. Moreover ... delayed and flexible decisionmaking also provides municipalities with significant
leverage over potential development in order to obtain developer
concessions. 68
As Cordes describes, case-by-case land use decisions often occur in a
"dealmaking" context, in which land is rezoned in exchange for concessions by the landowner. The problem this poses for courts, heargues, is how to properly control the ad hoc decisionmaking that has
come to characterize the zoning process. 6 9
67. Cordes, supra note 2, at 166-67.
68. !d. at 167.
69. !d.
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Many commentators have recognized the explicit dealmaking environment of land use allocation decisionmaking, 70 and practitioners
presume it as the norm. 71 One scholarly assessment of local practice
observes,
Local governments exhibit a marked talent for evading close examination of the conformity of their regulations to preexisting
plans. A venerable avoidance technique is vagueness; if the local government adopts a sufficiently vague plan, any land use
ordinance arguably conforms. In addition, local governments
have continued to develop new devices to retain "flexibility." All
of these put the locality into the desirable position of being able
to bargain ad hoc with individual developers. Variances and
conditional use permits-greatly expanded since SZEA daysare also traditional; and in more recent years we have seen
more elaborate devices such as "floating zones," "planned unit
developments," and "development rights transfers," all of which
tacitly admit that a locality has no fixed plan for appropriate
development, but instead wants to deal with individual projects
as they arise. 72
For some, the heavy reliance on bargaining practices promises
outcomes better tailored to the specific needs of the parties and more
closely approaching the Pareto frontier of efficiency. 73 For example,
Professor Lee Anne Fennell argues that bargaining over land use allocations is essential because zoning ordinances rarely provide the
most efficient initial allocation of entitlements between a landowner
70. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 26-27 (recognizing the bargaining environment generated by the modern zoning model); Terry Lewis et al., Spot Zoning,
Contract Zoning, and Conditional Zoning, 2 FLORIDA ENVIRONMENTAL AND LAND UsE
LAw, chapter 9, § IV(E) (The Florida Bar FL-CLES-7-1, 1994) (noting that the key to
implementing efficient development proposals "is negotiation between a government
and the developer."); Rose, supra note 62, at 849 (discussing use of bargaining in land
use development proposals); Wegner, supra note 1, at 958 (discussing the problems of
municipal land use bargaining).
71. Anecdotal evidence suggests that negotiation between developers and municipal planning staffs represents an important component of the early process of deciding permits and variances. See, e.g., interview with Damon Y. Smith, former planning
staff for the City of Cincinnati, in Brookline, MA (March 9, 2001); interview with Jerold S. Kayden, Professor of Land Use Planning at the Harvard Graduate School of
Design, in Cambridge, MA (April 10, 2001); oral communication with Lawrence E.
Susskind, Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at MIT, in Cambridge,
MA (April 6, 2001). Nevertheless, recent Supreme Court takings jurisprudence has
effectively muted some of the bargaining that formerly occurred in local planning offices. See, e.g., telephone interview with Liz Newton, Assistant to the City Manager
for the City of Tigard, OR (home to the famous Dolan v. City of Tigard case, 512 U.S.
374 (1994)), (March 28, 2001).
72. Rose, supra note 62, at 879-80.
73. See, e.g., Fennell, supra note 40, at 20-21.
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and the community. 74 This is inevitable, since zoning ordinances are
promulgated based on the subjective views of a political majority
about the desirability of various land uses:
If the initial allocation of property rights were set at the social
optimum (taking into account the preferences of everyone in the
relevant community, including the individual landowner), land
use bargains would be wholly unnecessary; there would be no
mutually advantageous trades available. Where the initial allocation diverges from the optimum, Pareto improvements can be
achieved through bargaining . . . . [I]ndividual landowners
would wish to purchase relevant portions of the collective property rights created through zoning whenever they stand to gain
more from the exchange than the community stands to lose.
Under such conditions, the land use "winner" can compensate
the "losers" and still come out ahead. The need for such transactions is palpable, because the initial allocation of collective property rights under zoning is not generated by market forces and
often bears little relationship to the actual and evolving demands of the population. Because information about true preferences is unavailable, even the most public-minded regulatory
body would be unable to determine the optimum initial allocation of property rights. 75
To Fennell, the problem with the modern zoning model is not that it
deviates too far from the uniform planning model, but that it erects
too many obstacles to the free-market movement of entitlements between municipalities and landowners. As zoning generates "a desire
for land use transactions without allowing those transactions to occur
freely," Fennell argues that the modern land use planning project
represents a fundamentally unstable arrangement. 76
Nevertheless, those who allege that the modern zoning model enables too much bargaining have proved more vociferous over the
years. As decisionmaking appears more and more ad hoc, interested
parties validly worry that their interests will not be fairly represented at the decisionmaking table. Generalized rules are presumed
to be preferable because they guarantee fairness in the disposition of
like cases, and the more particularized the decisionmaking process,
the harder it is for judicial review to assure that fairness has been
done. The trade-off is poignant: the more particularized the decision,
the more likely it is to produce optimal results in the individual
74. Id. Her efficiency calculation assumes that the community does not internalize the costs and benefits experienced by the individual landowner.
75. Id. at 21-25.
76. Id. at 26.
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case-but the more difficult it becomes to ensure state behavior that
conforms to constitutionally accepted norms of civic responsibility
and equal protection.
Concerns of this sort ultimately led to the judicial repudiation of
certain bargain-based zoning practices.
Critiquing the Dealmaking: the Rejection of Spot and Contract
Zoning. Zoning law's basic constraint against the improper public
usurpation of private interests in land use allocation is that the zoning ordinance is applied equally to all landowners. Accordingly, standard zoning enabling acts require that zoning ordinances apply
uniformly to all property within a district, in accord with the comprehensive plan, and that ordinances may be invalidated if they exceed
their scope of authority or are promulgated according to defective
procedures. 77 Critics argue that bargaining between municipalities
and landowners can trigger one or both of these prohibitions, yielding
presumptively invalid "spot" or "contract" zoning.
Spot zoning, the oldest recognized form of zoning corruption, involves the "singling out [of] a small parcel of land for a use classification totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the
benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of other
owners."78 As noted by the Alaska Supreme Court, "[s]pot zoning is
the very antithesis of planned zoning."79 Historically, spot zoning
concerns centered on municipal favoritism (or bribery), but the technique also represents a viable form of targeted persecution. Identified instances of spot zoning are always presumptively invalid, but
the cited rationale varies with the jurisdiction. Some courts view the
rule against spot zoning as rooted in the substantive due process requirement that government action be rationally related to a legitimate state interest; others understand it as a check on
discrimination, rooted in equal protection principles. 80 Still others
view the defect as stemming from the fact that spot zoning does not
serve any of the permissible purposes for which the zoning power
may be exercised.s 1
More troubling for advocates of municipal bargaining is the judicial rejection of "contract zoning," a roughly self-descriptive practice.
77. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at ch. 9 §l(C)(2), at 9-3.
78. Griswold v. City of Homer, 925 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Alaska 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Id at 1020.
80. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 358.
81. Id.
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Contract zoning involves a deal that creates an impermissible reciprocity of obligation between a private interest and a government entity.82 It has been variously defined as the "required exercise of the
zoning power pursuant to an express bilateral contract between the
property owner and the zoning authority" and as "the lack of a valid
basis independent of the contract on which to justify the zoning
amendment."83 Hostility toward the practice is grounded in the public policy concern that government not "barter away or delegate to a
private entity [its] responsibility to exercise the police power to promote the public health safety, and welfare."84
The problem with a deal arising under contract zoning is that it
would bind the government to specific terms that may ultimately prevent it from carrying out its public duties, while conferring on private
parties the special status found impermissible in spot zoning. In
Midtown Properties, Inc. v. Madison Township, 8 5 a New Jersey district court judge expressed the limits of a zoning board's power to
negotiate settlements of zoning disputes in these terms:
We would be permitting special rules to be established for plaintiff as against all other developers. We would be allowing these
parties to circumvent our state laws and the township's own ordinances and regulations by not having to apply for tentative
approval; giving of statutory notice to interested persons; holding of public hearings; filing of preliminary and final sketches;
making of uniform regulations; by-passing the Planning board's
hearings and recommendations; and destroying the township's
overall or master plan for the development of the township. 86
Contract zoning has been variously rejected as glorified spot zoning
and for contravening the general zoning procedural requirements of
notice and hearing. 87
The primary objection to contract zoning arises under the reserved powers doctrine, which serves to protect the public interest
against co-option lest municipal government succumb to capture by
private interests. The Supreme Court first promulgated the reserved
powers doctrine in the 1880 case of Stone v. Mississippi, 88 holding
82. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CoNTROL LAw §894
(1975).
83. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § III(A).
84. Id. at § III(C).
85. 172 A.2d 40 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1961), affd 189 A.2d 226 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1963).
86. Id at 46.
87. Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § III(B).
88. 101 U.S. 814, 820 (1880) (finding no contract violation when the legislative
grant of a twenty-five year charter to operate a statewide lottery was subsequently
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that the state legislature lacked power to cede its police power because to do so would exceed its authority from the people, and that
notwithstanding compromises possible of other government powers,
prerogatives associated with the police power always must be observed. Professor Judith Welch Wegner observes that
the coalescence of certain factors [in the case law] suggests an
incompatible blending of contract and police powers that may
give a court grounds for invalidating a resulting relationship:
the absence of reasonable clear governmental authority, marginal or unwarranted private expectations, and a strong, circumstance- and time-dependent public interest that has been
effected adversely.8 9
Under the reserved powers doctrine, the government may not "contract away" its police power, but "must retain the right to modify regulatory requirements as needed to respond to important public
health and safety concerns. It may not waive that right in return for
private concessions, at least where not explicitly authorized by statute and where private expectations to the contrary are unfounded or
ill-defined."90
The reserved powers problem represents a cogent critique that
cuts to the very legitimacy of government. In order to justify the
enormous powers entrusted to government to vindicate public interests (at the expense of private sovereignty) in land uses, zoning practice must be tailored to preserve the legitimate and effective exercise
of the police power.
From the opposite corner arises the critique that municipalities
should be prevented from conducting such bargaining under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, which prevents trades between an
individual and the government that implicate a constitutional protection afforded the individual. Where the reserved powers doctrine is
concerned with impermissible abdication of government responsibilities, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine protects individuals from exploitation in bargaining with the state. The concern is
that, in light of the enormous power imbalances that exist between
the state and any private individual, the individual may be coerced to
give up a constitutional right in the guise of a consensual exchange.
invalidated by state constitutional and statutory provisions outlawing lottery operations, because the state lacked authority to enter the original contract under the reserved powers doctrine).
89. Wegner, supra note 1, at 967.
90. Judith Welch Wegner, Utopian Visions: Cooperation Without Conflicts in
Public I Private Ventures, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 313, 337 (1991).
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In this sense, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine creates a
presumption that all such bargains are invalid under the contract
law principle of duress. To the individual who would argue that she
retain her autonomy to bargain with her rights if she chooses, the
strongest policy rationale answers that the doctrine is less about paternalism and more about constraining government abuse. If a state
actor knows that such a deal will be unenforceable, the incentives to
wrongfully wield authority abate. Professor Fennell explains that
the doctrine is thus best understood not in reference to protecting the
individual's best interest in any given case, but as a legitimizing constraint on state action:
Much analysis of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine has
focused on whether the government's bargain would leave the
individual better or worse off than she otherwise would be-in
other words, whether it is a true 'offer,' as opposed to a 'threat.'
. . . It is more accurate and fruitful to think of the Constitution
as placing structural constraints on the kinds of decisions officials and entities are permitted to make about individuals' lives,
and to view the unconstitutional conditions doctrine as an extension of these structural constraints. Applied to the bargaining setting, these structural constrains limit the sorts of things
that a particular governmental entity can legitimately give and
receive in trade ....
Considered in this light, the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine encompasses three distinct types of wrongful governmental action: (1) receiving forbidden goods, (2) bargaining with
currency illegitimately appropriated from the other party; and
(3) bargaining with currency illegitimately appropriated from
segments of the community that are not represented at the bargaining table. 91
She further cautions that the problems at the heart of unconstitutional conditions-though implicated in private-public dealmakingare endemic not to bargaining but to government, and the potential
for abuse by state actors:
A doctrine which focuses attention on bargains qua bargains
serves the practical function of promoting vigilance against government malfeasance in a setting where it is especially likely to
be implicated. It is important to note that the bargaining contest merely offers a focal point for detecting otherwise illicit government conduct. 92
91. Fennell, supra note 40 at 43-45.
92. Id at 45.

356

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 7:337

However persuasive its foundations, application of the doctrine is
porous in practice. Although we continue to reject bargains involving
voting rights, we don't object when the traded right is to trial by
jury-as demonstrated by the hegemonic status of plea bargaining in
the criminal justice system. Arguments for application in the realm
of land use planning are few, and weak. 93

The Rehabilitation of Contract Zoning? Some would argue that
the general rejection of contract zoning in the 1950s and 60s has been
circumvented by the subsequent widespread adoption of conditional
zoning agreements, under which-without legally committing itself
to a zoning change-the municipality secures a property owner's
promise to provide a remedial exaction or limit the proposed use in
some way as a condition of approval. Whereas contract zoning binds
the government to a certain course of action by virtue of its promise
to rezone, conditional zoning "contemplates a preceding act by the
property owner as a prerequisite to the approval a rezoning petition,"94 thus enabling the government to retain and satisfy its police
power responsibility to see that the zoning change is consistent with
the public interest.
Conditional zoning has gained wide acceptance to ameliorate the
rigidity of Euclid-style zoning. 95 For example, grouping all bargainbased land use mechanisms together under the heading "incentive
zoning," Professor Jerold Kayden describes the practice and the support it enjoyed before the new takings jurisprudence:
Through the land use regulatory technique formally known as
"incentive zoning," cities grant private real estate developers
the legal right to disregard zoning restrictions in return for
their voluntary agreement to provide urban design features
such as plazas, atriums, and parks, and social facilities and services such as affordable housing, day care centers, and job training. Since its inception some thirty years ago, incentive zoning
has enjoyed broad support from developers and their attorneys,
avoiding the legal challenges commonly brought against land
use regulations requiring the provision of public amenities.96
More modest bargain-based zoning mechanisms operate under the
comparatively neutral nomenclature of conditional use permits and
development agreements. 97 Many argue that the dichotomy drawn
93.
ditions
94.
95.
96.
97.

Cf id.; Kayden, supra note 58, at 41-43 (dismissing the unconstitutional condoctrine as a constraint on municipal land use bargains).
Lewis et al., supra note 70, at § IV(B).
ld. at § IV(E).
Kayden, supra note 58, at 3-4.
See, e.g., Wegner, supra note 90 at 338.
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between contract and conditional zoning creates a distinction without
a meaningful difference. 9 s
Municipal Bargaining as Mediation. Perhaps the most convincing theoretical analysis of the necessary role of bargaining in local
land use decisionmaking is from a 1983 analysis by Professor Carol
Rose. Working from an antifederalist perspective emphasizing local
participation over representative deliberation, Professor Rose has
proposed that mediation provides the most workable model from
which to understand and theorize about local land use dispute
resolution:
[Local zoning proceedings) are far more realistically perceived
as mediative than quasi-judicial. This is true with regard to the
quintessential small change, the variance; adjustment boards
treat requests for special zoning treatment as potential sources
of disputes, taking into account neighborhood protests and imposing conditions in order to reach accommodation. More sophisticated devices such as "planned unit developments" do the
same (although sometimes on a larger scale): local boards attend to disputes and attempt to find packages of conditions that
will lead to accommodation .... Even where the courts reject
these "dealing" qualities and attempt to treat piecemeal changes
quasi-judicially, they seem unable to avoid mediative forms,
with the concomitant expansion of issues and accommodationcentered goals.
A mediation model is more realistic and less distorting than
plan jurisprudence in deciphering not only the procedures of
piecemeal changes, but also the relationships among planning,
general ordinances, and piecemeal changes. In particular, if
piecemeal changes are treated as mediations, their "dealing'" aspects are not an undesirable aberration but natural parts of the
dispute resolution. In keeping with the open norms of mediation, an appropriate solution is not always a single answer complying with fixed standards, but rather a mix of
accommodations. Examples of these wide-ranging accommodations abound in modern land use practice .... To be sure, as Lon
Fuller has argued, government mediation differs from the usual
form: the government mediator has the authority to impose a

98. See ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 372 ("Most recent decisions abandon the prohibition on contract zoning, at least for those contracts now euphemistically styled as 'conditional' zoning."); see also Wegner, supra note 1, at 977-80
(grouping contract and conditional zoning techniques together under a theory of"contingent zoning").
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solution, and thus would seem free to favor one side over another. But this may not make a great deal of difference in practice ... even the mediator with a direct interest in the outcome is
expected to hear all parties and come to an acceptable
compromise. 99
Mediation practice has developed considerably since Rose wrote, offering a potentially useful font of resources-including best practices
and ethical guidelines-that potentially bear on more modern
problems in municipal land use bargaining. Professor Lawrence
Susskind has made particularly skillful use of mediation practice in
the related realm of negotiated rulemaking.1oo
The Spectrum of Potential Bargains. Thus, the tools of zoning
offer private and public parties of interest to a proposed land use a
series of bargaining alternatives.
When a developer seeks permission to build in contravention of a
municipal zoning ordinance, bargaining options may be represented
along a continuum between rigid adherence to the plan and free-market flexibility to bargain. At the adherence end of the spectrum, the
municipality could (and indeed should) simply deny the request to
protect against the harms implied by violating the land use plan.
This is the response dictated by the traditional (but generally repudiated) zoning model discussed above.
Alternatively, the municipality and the developer could negotiate
a solution whereby the project would be allowed subject to the developer's remedying the harm. Although the scope of what would constitute an adequate remedy is left to the parties, we might consider this
form of bargaining constrained by a nexus, or relationship, in the medium of exchange. Some relationship would exist between the proscribed harm and the consideration provided by the developer in
exchange for the discretionary permit.
At the most flexible end of the bargaining spectrum, the municipality could decide that although the development implies real harm
for some public good that may be fundamentally irremediable-it
might nevertheless grant an exception allowing the project if the developer makes available resources to provide some unrelated public
good that the community values more than it does prevention of the
99. Rose, supra note 62, at 889-92.
100. Lawrence Susskind, The Risks and the Advantages of Agency Discretion: Evidence from EPA's Project XL, 17 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 67 (1999). See also Jody
Freeman & Laura I. Langbein, Regulatory Negotiation and the Legitimacy Benefit, 9
NYU ENVTL. L. J. 60 (2000) (discussing participant experiences in negotiated
rulemaking).
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avoidable harm. Taking a step further in this direction, if it really
values the proposed benefit more than it does prevention of the avoidable harm, the municipality might trade its permission for the provision of an unrelated public benefit even if the initial harm could be
remedied. These are the conditions of full-free market bargaining,
under which all parties are at liberty to alienate rights and entitlements as they please.
In 1986, municipalities and landowners operated along various
points of this continuum, variously constrained by local regulations,
the boundaries of one another's' willingness to deal, the peculiar circumstances of each individual proposal, good faith and common
sense.
Enter the takings revolution.
IV.

THE SUPREME COURT RESPONDS: THE REINVENTION OF TAKINGS

In recent years, responding to concerns that landowners were
unduly suffering at the hands of municipal planners, the Supreme
Court has reinvigorated takings remedies as a means of strengthening private property rights against regulatory interference. In a
noteworthy departure from other areas of jurisprudence where it has
strengthened public interests at the expense of private interests, 101
the Court has shifted the rules for resolving municipal land use disputes from a set more respectful of the police power to a set significantly more solicitous of private rights.
Many observers have condemned the new takings jurisprudence
for its weakening of a community's ability to regulate for the public

101. For example, compare the Supreme Court's rebalancing of private rights and
police power interests in its habeas corpus jurisprudence in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
443, 447 (1953) (expanding access to habeas in holding that federal claims adjudicated in a state court could be raised for federal de novo review on habeas) (abrogated
by the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2259(d))
with Wainright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (curtailing access to habeas in holding
that state level procedural defaults including, failures to properly raise constitutional
claims, may be treated as deliberate waiver preempting federal habeas review); and
in its abortion rights jurisprudence, compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973)
(establishing the three-trimester rule for balancing the woman's private right to bodily autonomy against the state's interest in fetal life, under which the private right is
paramount until the second trimester) with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872 (1992) (replacing the Roe trimester rule
with a balancing test that increases the state's power to restrict first and second trimester abortions).
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health and safety; 102 just as many have praised the Court for bolstering the special deference that has historically adhered to rights in
real property. 103 Indeed, a rule that would satisfy both sides is probably impossible to create. However, the immediate effect of the new
rules, established in a several important cases since 1987, is to drastically reduce the permissible scope of bargaining in land use dispute
resolution. Whether or not any party of interest truly stands to benefit remains unclear.
The Historical Roots of Takings Doctrine. As the zoning model of
land use regulation assumed prominence, governments at all levels
struggled to balance the tension between those aspects of land ownership recognized as inherently private and the collective responsibilities associated with land use choices by communities; the zone of
conflict between them is nowhere more observable than in the lawsuits that arise between private and public parties to takings disputes. In the regional planning context, a taking complaint arises
when a landowner alleges that government action infringes on her
property rights beyond the bounds permitted by legitimate zoning
authority. 104
In wrestling with these difficult cases, courts have proposed an
evolving directive as to where the balance should be struck. Although early understandings of the takings clause presumed its application only to physical invasions of land, 105 the Supreme Court
first recognized in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon 106 the possibility
that a statute could so restrict land use as to constitute a taking of
property rights requiring compensation. In Pennsylvania Coal, the
Court held that a statute prohibiting coal mining in a manner that
102. See, e.g., Robert A. Williams, Jr., Legal Discourse, Social Vision, and the Supreme Court's Land Use Planning Law: The Genealogy of the Lochnerian Recurrence
in First English Lutheran Church and Nollan, 59 U. CoLO. L. REv. 427, 470-71
(1988).
103. See, e.g., Robert M. Washburn, Land Use Control, the Individual, and Society:
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 52 Mo. L. REv. 162, 164 (1993).
104. Some complaints allege that the comprehensive plan itself constitutes a taking. See, e.g., Buckles v. King County, 191 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 1999).
105. Mugler v. Kansas, 8 S. Ct. 273, 276 (1887) (holding in that regulatory interference with economic use of land does not constitute a taking when regulation is a
valid expression of the police power); see also William Michael Treanor, The Original
Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 CoLUM. L. REv.
782, 785-92 (1995) (discussing the limited historical basis for the rule of compensating
takings and the early practice of applying the rule only for physical invasion); PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 780-81.
106. 260 u.s. 393, 415-16 (1922).
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could damage homes on the surface effected a taking because it effectively abolished the value of the underlying mineral rights. 107 Pennsylvania Coal represents the first successful "regulatory taking"
claim and an early high point of the Supreme Court's interest in private property rights against public claims-an apex only notable in
light of the changes that immediately followed.
The 1922 Pennsylvania Coal decision preceded the Court's 1926
validation of zoning laws in Euclid, and perhaps coincidentally, the
Court shortly thereafter retreated from the strong implications of the
Pennsylvania Coal view. Only a few years later, that case was not
even cited in a 1928 decision rejecting a similarly-reasoned taking
claim and affirming that even regulations resulting in the destruction of property will not effect takings if they are designed to protect
against certain kinds of public harm.- In Miller v. Schoene, 108 the
Court reiterated the legitimacy of the police power to vindicate the
public welfare, noting that "where the public interest is involved, preferment of that interest over the property interests of the individual,
to the extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of the police power which affects property."109 Over the next half-century, regulatory takings claims were
subject to a form of rational basis scrutiny affording deference to local
land use regulation. no
For a moment in 1987, it may have seemed that the cycle had
fully turned when the Court decided Keystone Bituminous Coal v.
DeBenedictis.l 11 Evaluating facts nearly identical to those in Pennsylvania Coal, the Court reached the opposite conclusion-finding no
taking because the challenged mining restrictions responded to a significant threat to public safety.l1 2
First English and the Advent of Temporary Takings Liability.
However, 1987 proved a watershed year in takings jurisprudence less
107. Id.
108. 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) (upholding against a taking claim a state law used to
require the destruction of a diseased tree on private land to prevent the spread of the
disease to trees on neighboring lands).
109. ld. at 279-280.
110. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962). Cf Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 843-45 (1987) (Brennan, J. dissenting); see also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 21, at 341 (noting great judicial
deference to zoning decisions based on their "legislative" nature).
111. 480 u.s. 470 (1987).
112. ld. (distinguishing Pennsylvania Coal by finding no evidence that the challenged law had unduly interfered with Keystone Bituminous's "investment-backed
expectations").
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for resolving the hanging Pennsylvania Coal issue and more for challenging the settled parameters of the public-private balance in takings disputes. Although Keystone Bituminous vindicated the public
interest over the private, two other 1987 decisions were designed to
temper what the Court perceived as unauthorized public overreaching. In First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 113 the Court articulated a stunning new reach for regulatory
takings. Using a case ultimately dismissed on remand for its weak
facts, the Court established municipal liability to compensate temporary takings through damages despite a state law limiting remedies
to invalidation of the regulation effecting a taking. Recognizing that
invalidation of a zoning ordinance could potentially render any regulatory act a temporary taking, the Court nevertheless held that the
Constitution requires "that the government pay the landowner for
the value of the use of the land during this period." 114 First English
raised the possibility not only that retracted municipal regulations
could generate takings claims, but that municipalities could be subject to monetary damages even after their retraction. The decision
poses a considerable deterrent to municipal experimentation with
land use regulations that could later be declared takings.
The Nollan "Nexus" Principle. Then, in Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, 115 arguably the most important of the 1987 trilogy, the Court tightened its scrutiny of conditional use permits and
regulatory exactions, requiring a firm nexus between harm and
remediation. In Nollan, landowners brought a takings suit after unsuccessfully seeking permission to expand development on the property in contravention of a coastal zoning ordinance. Finding that the
new construction would obstruct visual access to the seashore, the
Coastal Commission had offered the desired permit in exchange for
an easement that would allow the public access across a portion of
the Nollans' property connecting two public beaches. Writing for the
Court, Justice Scalia observed that the government could reasonably
require an exaction that substantially furthered the interest frustrated by the permitted use-for example, the construction of a public
viewing platform to allow visual access to the beach over the top of
the development. 116 However, as the proposed condition lacked an
113. 482 u.s. 304, 318 (1987).
114. Id. at 319. Nevertheless, the claim in question was ultimately rejected on
remand, as the challenged regulation was found to promote the legitimate interest of
public safety and was also a reasonable temporary measure. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1367 (1989).
115. 483 u.s. 825, 839 (1987).
116. Id. at 836.
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"essential nexus" to the harm threatened by the disfavored use, the
Court found it unauthorized by the zoning law, and that absent legitimate police power authority to prevent the development, the government had indeed effected a taking. 117 Although the Commission
could have withheld the permit altogether, the Court reasoned, it
could not condition the permit on a concession by the applicant unconnected to the justification for a legitimate prohibition. 118
As Justice Scalia explained in a later decision, the Nollan nexus
principle was articulated to protect property owners against municipal "extortion" 119 by constraining the scope of permissible bargaining
in land use disputes. And indeed, the new doctrine significantly modified the available options to municipal parties entertaining applications for controversial land use permits. On the spectrum of potential
bargaining, the nexus rule continues to allow for some municipal bargaining, but eliminates the third and fourth set of possible deals (the
free-market bargains). Requiring nexus clearly constrains potential
abuse, but reducing the permissible scope of bargaining also limits
the creativity with which landowners and municipalities can approach complex land use problems.
Since 1987, the Court's takings jurisprudence has grown increasingly solicitous ofthe private interests in land use. Most famously, in
1992, the Court revisited the problem raised in Pennsylvania Coal
and Keystone Bituminous of defining regulatory takings. In Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Commission, 120 the Court found a taking
where a developer was denied permission to build in a coastal erosion
zone, clarifying that takings liability will be found whenever land use
regulations effect a full deprivation (or "total wipeout") of economically viable uses of a parcel of land. 121 Despite lingering questions
about the meaning of "full deprivation" and the severability of land
117. Id. at 837.
118. Id.
119. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994). ("The absence of a nexus
left the Coastal Commission in the position of simply trying to obtain an easement
through gimmickry, which converted a valid regulation of use into an 'out-and-out
plan of extortion"') (citations omitted).
120. 505 u.s. 1003, 1019 (1992).
121. The events that followed the Lucas case are apocryphal. In 1993, the South
Carolina Coastal Council agreed to permit the development, but Lucas pursued temporary takings compensation in state court. In 1993, the Council settled the lawsuit
by agreeing to purchase the parcel for $850,000, plus $725,000 in interest, attorneys'
fees, and costs, for a total settlement of $1,575,000. The following year, the state
resold the parcel to a developer who built in the restricted erosion zone. In 1996,
severe coastal erosion undermined the house in the Lucas lot and an adjacent home.
Nevertheless, other South Carolina homeowners are seeking to overturn state antierosion land use regulations. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 803.
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parcels for the purposes of this analysis, 122 the Lucas decision signified the seriousness with which the Court meant to reallocate the
costs of public land use regulation away from private property holders. Commentators warned municipalities that the Court's clear
message was that the public-private balance in land use interests
had leaned too far in favor of the public. 1 23
The Other Shoe Drops: Dolan and ((Rough Proportionality." Two
years later, the Court dealt the final blow to municipal land use bargaining. In Dolan v. City of Tigard, 124 the Court again narrowed the
permissible circumstances under which land use permits could be
conditioned on related concessions, adding to the Nollan requirement
a stricter standard of proportionality. On the spectrum of potential
bargaining, the new rule serves to considerably reduce potential bargains even in the nexus set, by eliminating possibilities for parties to
trade on the different values each assigns to goods of the negotiation.
In Dolan, when a hardware retailer sought permission to pave a
large parking lot and expand the business into the restricted floodplain of a local river, the municipality approved the development subject to conditions imposed by its comprehensive plan. In light of the
increased storm-water runoff implied by the paved lot and the increased traffic promoted by the expanded business, the municipality
proposed conditioning the permit on the dedication of a portion of the
property lying in the floodplain for improvement of a storm drainage

122. See, e.g., id. at 800-02. One problem with the Lucas decision is referred to as
the "denominator problem," because the Court left unclear how to evaluate when a
total wipeout has occurred. If a regulation extinguishes all economically viable use
from 75% of a large land parcel, does that represent a "total wipeout" of the economically viable use of that part of the land, or has no taking occurred because there is still
economically viable use of the remaining 25%? See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1061-77
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
123. Despite the universal anticipation of large-scale changes immediately after
Lucas, commentators more recently note that little has changed. See, e.g., PERCIVAL
ET AL., supra note 19. However, in recent treatment of comparable takings claims, the
Federal Circuit appears to be leaning again toward a standard of greater municipal
deference in its increasingly stringent evaluation of "reasonable, investment-backed
expectations" in analyzing claims of undue economic deprivations. Several recent decisions consider whether market conditions at the time of investment reflected zoning
ordinances such that reasonable investment-backed expectations should be considered to reflect applicable land use restrictions. See, e.g., Good v. United States, 189
F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (holding that the denial of a permit to develop wetlands was not a taking because the owner did not have "reasonable, investmentbacked expectations" to develop the wetland in light of the regulatory climate in place
when the developer acquired the land).
124. 512 u.s. 374, 391 (1994).
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system, and of an additional strip adjacent to the floodplain for apedestrian/bicycle pathway. Though the Court conceded that an "essential nexus" existed between the legitimate state interest and the
permit condition exacted by the city, the Court nevertheless found
that the exaction failed the "required degree" of connection between
the exaction and the projected impact of the proposed development.
Notably, the city could have simply denied the permit; it was the act
of conditioning the permit on an unsubstantially related concession
that failed the Court's scrutiny. Writing for the Court, Chief Justice
Rehnquist called this new requirement the test of "rough
proportionality. "125
Mter the case was remanded to the state court, Dolan amended
her complaint to include a temporary takings claim. She argued that
not only was the regulatory exaction unconstitutional, but that the
city's wrongful withholding of the building permit over the course of
negotiation (and litigation) over the proposed use constituted an unconstitutional temporary taking for which the city owed her compensation. The City eventually paid $1.5 million in compensation. 126
Suitum: Transferable Development Rights under Nexus and Proportionality? A final takings case of note in the land use context is
Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 127 in which the Court
held that failure to sell transferable development rights (TDRs) will
not prevent ripeness of a taking claim. This decision is noteworthy in
a discussion of bargaining because the sale of transferable development rights suggests an elementary form of bargaining that may
uniquely satisfy the tests of nexus and rough proportionality. Although the Suitum decision primarily addresses the question of finality (finding sufficient finality for ripeness when no further questions
exist as to how the challenged regulation will affect the specific property), the odd constellation of opinions suggests an interesting possible municipal defense to takings claims. In his concurrence, Justice
Scalia argued that the matter of TDRs was irrelevant to the matter of
whether a taking had occurred; their issue simply went to the evidentiary matter of whether just compensation had been paid. However,
since only three justices signed that concurrence, it is possible that a
125. Three years later, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 702-03 (1999), the Court limited application of the Dolan "rough proportionality" test to disputes concerning exactions, holding it inapplicable in the context
of outright permit denials.
126. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 820.
127. 520 u.s. 725, 733-34 (1997).
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majority of the Court believes that the issuance of TDRs could automatically defeat a takings claim, since their subsequent sale always
renders at least some economically viable use of a property. 128

v.

THE AFTERMATH: THE IMPACT OF TAKINGS
DECISIONS ON PLANNING

Following the Court's decision in Dolan, commentators of all
stripes hailed the significance of the decision and predicted a dramatic impact on local planning practice. 129 Five years later, however,
the actual impact of the new rules remains unclear. Many commentators and practitioners suggest that only marginal changes have occurred.13o Why the disjuncture?
Four possibilities arise: (1) no changes were necessary because
most planners were already engaged in bargaining practices the Supreme Court would find acceptable under the new rules; (2) planners
haven't changed their practices because they aren't sure how to
change them to be in conformity with the new rules; (3) changes haven't occurred because the new rules are impossible to follow and
planners are disregarding them; and (4) planners have not changed
their practices because they don't care about breaking the law. Overwhelming evidence (some reviewed above) suggests that the first alternative does not represent reality, and the fourth alternative seems
equally unlikely. The truth probably lies somewhere between the
second and third proposition. 131
Anecdotal Evidence. Anecdotal evidence is decidedly mixed as to
how the new rules have impacted practices at the ground level. Liz
Newton, Assistant to the City Manager of Tigard, Oregon (the defendant municipality in the Dolan case) reports that in Tigard, the planning process has become more formal but less creative-staff reports
are longer, permit applications are scanned with a fine-tooth comb,
and where once Tigard planners "followed the spirit of the law, now
they hang on every letter." 132 The rules have added to the cost of
development in Tigard because the City now requires that developers
provide all the studies necessary to document proportionality.
128. Cf. PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 19, at 828.
129. See PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 1.
130. See oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71.
131. Professor Lawrence Susskind, among the most esteemed experts in the field
of government land and environmental disputes resolution, suggests that local planners have continued to operate without regard to the rules, in part because they are
difficult to understand and even more difficult to apply in the complex decisionmaking arenas in which planners operate. Id.
132. See interview with Newton, supra note 71.
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Newton reports that after Dolan was decided, she took calls from
planners all over the country, most of whom told her that they simply
planned to "tighten up their codes" and avoid any action that could
potentially lead to litigation.1aa
According to Newton, Tigard planners felt particularly betrayed
after the decision because they believed they had acted in complete
concert with the law. Oregon is renowned for its regional planning
programs, and all241 cities and 46 counties are governed by comprehensive plans that are reviewed by the state. 134 The dedications that
Tigard planners had asked for (and that became the subject of litigation in the Dolan case) were part of a comprehensive plan that had
long been approved by the state; out of respect to landowners, dedications were to be required only at the time of a development permitting, when a landowner would be expecting a new source of profit. 135
(She suggests that this is why the Dolan claim "sailed through the
state courts without a hitch" before being taken up by the Supreme
Court.) 136 Unsure of how they could have done things differently, the
response of Tigard planners has been simply to act conservatively,
hold their heads down, and hope for the best.137
Damon Smith, a former planner with the City Planning Office in
Cincinnati, Ohio remembers planners feeling very concerned and "on
edge" after the Nollan and Dolan cases were decided. 138 "Everyone
thought they would change the planning landscape," he recalls, but
in the end, no real changes came to pass in terms of land uses and
dealmaking. 139 The only difference, he ultimately concludes, was
that the bargaining was driven underground after Dolan: rather than
meeting with the zoning authority to discuss mutually agreeable solutions to a proposed land use requiring permission, developers facing the possibility of a denied permit would now meet directly with
planning staff, with whom they would create an informal joint proposal that they would later propose to the zoning authority on their own
initiative. 140
Indeed, some states legally differentiate between (preferred) proposals for deals volunteered by a developer and (suspect) deals
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

ld.
ld.
Id.
ld.
ld.
See interview with Smith, supra note 71.
ld.
ld.
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originating from the municipality, 141 although the practice of "underground bargaining" renders unclear any meaningful line between the
two. 142 The shift to underground bargaining described by the Cincinnati planner is particularly troubling because it implicates the
very equal protection values that opponents of spot and contract zoning sought to protect, since the practice favors repeat players with
special access to planning staff and knowledge of the underground
bargaining ritual. The farther the bargaining process moves from the
official authority, the more removed the process becomes from the
public scrutiny that would expose favoritism or corruption.
Anecdotal evidence thus suggests a mixed impact by the takings
rules. It is reported that municipalities have enacted more exacting
procedures to document nexus and proportionality that are costly and
expensive, 143 and simultaneously reported that dealmaking is as
much in evidence as it ever was, 144 in most respects unchanged. 145
Of course, the two are not incompatible truths. A study in California
was recently undertaken to provide answers to these questions; its
more rigorously gathered results confirm the anecdotal evidence.
The California Planning Study. In the most comprehensive primary analysis to date, the California Research Bureau commissioned
Daniel Pollak to research how the takings decisions are actually impacting the practice of land use planning in the particularly growthembattled state of California. 146 Pollak surveyed the director of
every city and county planning department in the state, 147 performed
follow-up interviews, and conducted six detailed case studies to explore the impacts of the Supreme Court's decisions, focusing on the
following questions:
• Visibility of takings issues: Are concerns about takings a
prominent feature of land use issues today? To what degree
141. See Wegner, supra note 1, at 992 (identifying Virginia, Iowa, and Minnesota
as states that only allow contingent zoning deals when proposed by the landowner or
are clearly "voluntary").
142. Furthermore, it is unclear why the origin of the proposal alters objections
founded on both the reserved powers and unconstitutional conditions doctrines. See
Kayden, supra note 58.
143. See, e.g., interview with Newton, supra note 71.
144. See, e.g., interview with Smith, supra note 71.
145. See, e.g., oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71.
146. See PoLLAK, supra note 16.
147. Pollak received responses from 37 out of 58 counties (63%) and 274 out of 472
cities (58.1 %). He notes that although his data pool is large, it is not a random sample
because it includes only data from those who chose to respond. Id. at 13.
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have local governments taken notice of the Supreme Court rulings? Have the takings rulings created pressure on local governments to change their practices, decisions or policies?
• Impact of takings on land use planning and regulation: Have
the takings rulings influenced how local governments plan and
regulate land use? Have they made local governments more
cautious? Has the fear of litigation created a chilling effect?
How have local governments adapted to the changed legal
climate?
• Exactions: Have the takings rulings had an impact on how
local governments use exactions? Have the rulings in any way
inhibited their use of exactions as a tool for financing public infrastructure and services?

• What are the policy implications of these changes? 148
Although the survey targets familiarity with legal concepts and
processes, Pollak considered and rejected sending the survey to government planning attorneys, as the research sought to identify the
impact of these legal concerns on ground-level land-use
decisionmaking.
According to Pollack's results, the majority of planners claimed
to be familiar with the First English, Nollan, and Dolan cases (but
less so with Lucas, Suitum, and Del Monte Dunes), and county planners were more familiar with all cases than more local planners. 149
Takings disputes were twice as frequent at the county level than at
the city level, and most often involved fees or exactions relating to
open space, parks, trails, transportation infrastructure, and school
fees. 150 Although 49% of counties and 22% of cities report receiving
takings litigation threats at least once a year, very few have insurance to cover liability arising from takings claims. 1 5 1 Nineteen percent of cities and 35% of counties reported reducing their use of some
forms of fees and exactions in response to takings law, mostly those
involving roads and traffic-related infrastructure, open space, trails,
or public access to natural resources. 152 Fifty-five percent of cities
and 89% of counties report that they have adopted new standards for
creating written findings or an administrative record ofland use decisions, and 45% of cities and 42% of counties reported having adopted
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

ld. at 2.
ld. at 13-14.
ld. at 5, Executive Summary.
Id.
Id.

370

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 7:337

new standards, guidelines, or policies for the use of fees and
exactions. 153
Most interestingly, the problem of disentangling the public from
the private interests that land use planning seeks to protect was reflected in the planners' attitudes toward the value of the new takings
rules. Pollak observes:
We might expect planners to express their dissatisfaction with
the current situation, since it imposes constraints on their powers to plan and regulate. However ... a clear majority of respondents (74% of cities and 81% of counties) either agreed or
strongly agreed with the statement ["The nexus and rough proportionality standards established by the Nollan and Dolan decisions, when followed carefully, simply amount to good land use
planning practice.") ....
[However,] a minority (36% of both cities and counties)
agree with the statement ["U.S. Supreme Court decisions on
takings have helped to create a legal climate that reduces our
city/county's ability to manage land development to serve the
needs of our community."]. We might term this group the "worried planners." They tend to think that the takings issue has
made it more difficult for them to do their job of serving the public interest. 154
Notably, these two groups of planners-representing those who believe that nexus and proportionality represent good land use planning and those who believe that the Nollan and Dolan decisions have
helped to create a legal climate that inhibits their ability to serve the
public interest-were not mutually exclusive:
It was quite possible ... for a respondent to see the Nollan and
Dolan precedents as good land use planning practice and still
feel the legal climate surrounding the takings issue was harmful. Twelve counties, or one third, and 70 cities, or 26%, fit that
description. 155
One possible inference from this paradox is that planners believe that
bargains constrained by nexus and proportionality are generally good
planning choices, but that the loss of flexibility to depart from that
structure in some circumstances hampers their ability to solve the
more complicated planning problems. Alternatively, it could be that
the legal climate has simply shifted landowners' best alternative to a
153. Id. at 6.
154. Id. at 32-34, Full Study.
155. Id. at 34.
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negotiated agreement (BATNA) toward court, making the negotiation
process more antagonistic.
Despite its valuable portrait of the workings of California municipal planning (and its important recommendation that municipalities
cooperate to insure against takings claims), 156 Pollak's study generally affirms the uncertainty surrounding the municipal response to
takings questions that inspired the study in the first place. While
many jurisdictions have not changed their regulatory behavior in response to the takings rulings, a sizeable minority have done so. 157
Pollak's rigorous statistical analysis revealed no significant correlation between community characteristics and survey responses, 158
other than the city/county divide.159
Nevertheless, Pollak concludes that takings are a high profile issue in many communities, and that the Court's decisions are making
an impact in many communities. The experience of increased cautiousness is "pervasive," even among respondents who "had difficulty
putting their finger on the precise changes that had occurred." 160
Sixty-three percent of cities and 60% of counties have contracted with
consultants to prepare studies on fees and exactions. 161 Planners
note increased costs of compliance (especially in increments of time
and money for compiling proportionality data), much of which is
passed on to developers. 162 Pollak quotes land use planning expert
William Fulton as reporting that he has not seen much change in the
156. Noting that nearly all commercial insurance policies available to cities and
counties contain a standard exclusion that omits takings claims from coverage, Pollak
suggests that cities follow the example of several large California cities that have
organized under their joint powers authority the Big Independent Cities Excess Pool,
which enables members to self-insure against takings liability. ld. at 77.
157. ld. at 77-78; 6-7, Executive Summary.
158. ld. at 115-29. Pollak did observe an increase in takings-related phenomena
with increasing city population size (though not in counties), possibly the result of
larger numbers of actors and development projects. However, the survey response
rate also increased with city population size, indicating that this correlation may not
be reliable.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 149-50. This may reflect the fact that
counties are more likely to be in control of large tracts of undeveloped land and to
represent more heterogeneous communities of interest, leading to conflicts over
sprawl, open space, agricultural preservation, etc. PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 76.
160. ld. at 79.
161. ld. at 80.
162. See, e.g., Clyde W. Forrest, Planned Unit Development and Takings Post Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 571, 580-81 (1995) ("The expense and time delay of ad hoc
studies to establish adequate findings of fact may kill worthwhile projects ... It must
surely be understood by developers that such evidence will now be required of them at
their expense."); interview with Newton, supra note 71 (noting that Tigard, Oregon,
has passed most of the costs for such data gathering on to developers).
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substantive practice of land use planning because of takings, but noting that "it has changed the psychology when the planner and the
developer are negotiating. It has given the developer more leverage."163 (In other words, and as suggested above, it has changed the
parties' BATNAs.)
Although recognizing that constraints on localities' abilities to finance public infrastructure through fees and exactions may strain
local budgets and make it more difficult to simultaneously manage
land use and accommodate growth, Pollak concludes that the takings
issue can encourage beneficial rationalization of the planning process.164 He takes encouragement from results indicating that "[t]he
takings rules mean that decisions that are made in an ad hoc or improvisatory way will tend to be more vulnerable to legal challenge
than those that are carefully formulated as part of a long-range
policy ."165
But this reasoning brings us full circle to the more important
question at hand: whether or not constricting "ad hoc, improvisatory"
decisionmaking is an unqualified good. As Contra Costa County respondent Dennis Barry noted, the rules take the creativity out of
planning, and he expressed nostalgia for the days before the new
rules, when he could practice "the art of public administration, the
ability to negotiate with applicants in administering regulations, not
the cold hard science of Nollan and Dolan." 166 Indeed, Pollak's recommendations to planners based on the results of the study are that
they avoid case-by-case decisionmaking and employ comprehensive
fee structures over exactions as much as possible to avoid even the
threat of costly but ultimately meritless lawsuits. 167 He concedes
that a staggering problem for older municipalities near build-out in
the wake of nexus and proportionality is the problem of cumulative
impacts, whereby individual impacts too small to justify exactions aggregate over time to create significant demand for new infrastructure
that must finally be realized when later development begins (but
nexus and proportionality prevent assessing the cost from new development beyond its share).168
Bargaining Nexus and Proportionality. The problem of cumulative impacts offers one lens through which to analyze the question of
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

See PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 80.
ld. at 75-76, 81.
Id. at 8, Executive Summary.
Id. at 82, Full Study.
Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 83.
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the permissible scope of bargaining under nexus and proportionality.
Costs are difficult to allocate proportionately over time, especially
when earlier cost-bearers are no longer available to absorb a cost that
becomes manifest to a community only at the tipping point of the new
development. What kinds of bargains should be allowed when a perfect mechanism of cost-allocation is not available? Consider the following hypothetical land use conflict:
Suppose a landowner seeks to subdivide property on which she
lives to allow a developer to construct there a small set of luxury condominiums. She lives on part of a large parcel at the edge of a protected greenbelt, and she wants to sell the vacant land to finance her
children's educations (or a church food pantry, or a free veterinary
clinic, or to send a local fourth grade class to college ... ). The vacant
area is the last undeveloped area in the district of the municipality
zoned for single-family homes, and the surrounding community relies
on public infrastructure already burdened to capacity. Because the
developer wants to build multi-unit housing, he needs to obtain some
kind of variance from the zoning board in order to build.
The zoning board does not object in principle to the condominiums, because there are not many of them, they are to be located in
the farthest outskirts of town, and designs indicate that they will be
mostly hidden from the view of other homeowners. The members of
the board do not believe that allowing the construction would undermine the values articulated in the community's comprehensive plan.
However, existing sewer infrastructure would collapse if subject to
the additional strain of these new homes without improvement, and
soil conditions (and local ordinances) render the area unsuitable for
septic use. Absent the new development, the sewers can be maintained through the usual means afforded by local property taxes, but
the board cannot allow the development to proceed without a plan for
improving the lines that would connect the new condominiums with
the municipal waste treatment plant.
Most community members are indifferent to the construction of
the new units, but they are unwilling to pay more taxes to finance the
needed improvements. Area environmentalists strongly oppose the
construction of a new waste treatment site, as they believe that a
significant expansion of infrastructure would ultimately encourage a
relaxation of planning ordinances to allow incursion into the protected green space surrounding the community. Since this is the last
undeveloped area in the district, the municipality cannot expect to
gradually recoup investment in improved lines from later development projects.
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Thus, the board is considering two options. First, it could simply
deny the requested use, since they possess full authority under the
zoning laws to decline permission for variances. Alternatively, it
could approve the variance through a conditional use permit according to which the developer would agree to conduct or finance the necessary improvements required by the new units.
Naturally, the developer would prefer not to finance the improvements single-handedly, but he believes that area characteristics will
render the luxury condominiums exceedingly valuable, probably
enough so that he would earn a handsome profit even under the
terms of the municipality's conditional use proposal. In any event,
the deal would remain particularly appealing if the landowner discounts her selling price in light of the municipal exaction. Since a
sale to a multiunit developer even at a discount will bring her a better price than a sale for the development of a single-family house, he
thinks it likely that the landowner will bargain.
What should happen here? Before Nollan, it is likely that the
board would not have skipped a beat in proposing the exaction as a
condition of approving the requested use. Before Dolan, the proposal
may still have survived a takings challenge, because the exaction arguably bears the Nollan-required nexus to the preventable harm.
The municipality would take the position that the zoning ordinance
requires single-family homes because, inter alia, the sewer system
cannot support the increased burden of multiunit residential housing
on small lots of land.
However, the proposal would almost certainly fail the scrutiny
afforded by Dolan's additional requirement. Although the nature of
the exaction is tailored to remedy the harm implied by the nonconforming use, its scope lacks the rough proportionality required by the
Supreme Court. The new units will only marginally increase the
strain on existing infrastructure that has been brought to capacity
over time with the construction of each new single-family home.
Under the rubric of rough proportionality, the magnitude of the exaction must be proportional to the magnitude of the harm implied by
the proposed variance. The "last developer in line" cannot be made to
shoulder the entire costs of new infrastructure necessitated not just
by the project in question but by years of growth in a community. 1 69
Does it matter that "but for" the contribution of this development, the admittedly useful improvements would be unnecessary?
Thus far, the "but-for problem" has not received attention from the
169. Id. at 83-84.
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Court. However, the tenacity of the Dolan opinion should give any
municipality pause in testing judicial patience on the matter. As notably demonstrated in Dolan's temporary takings claim after her Supreme Court victory, the combustible pairing of nexus and
proportionality with the First English precedent results in considerable municipal exposure to damages liability if a landowner seeking a
questionable permit challenges a proposed exaction. Under the current regime, the municipality should always deny a controversial permit, because attempts to negotiate a creative exaction could, if
invalidated, expose the municipality to liability for a temporary taking over the period during which development was delayed (or at
least to the legal costs of defending itself). The negotiating environment created by these legal rules yields a strong incentive for municipalities to simply deny permits, even when a mutually beneficial
trade could be engineered that would satisfy the landowner and mitigate the public harms associated with the project.
But what about the possibility of mutually beneficial trades?
Should it matter if the municipality, landowner, and developer would
each be happy with the bargain? According to the facts of the above
hypothetical, a rationally acting developer would want to abide by
the terms of the conditional use permit, if the alternative is that the
permit be denied, since he stands to turn a profit. The landowner
would want to sell the land for the highest price possible, which may
be to the developer, even at a discount. (Of course, if the landowner
could successfully invalidate the condition in court, receive a full
price, and receive compensation for a temporary taking, she might
prefer that alternative instead.) The municipality might be more
neutral toward the deal than the other parties, but the deal would
nevertheless please one community member without unduly harming
others, slightly increase the local tax base, and yield beneficial improvements to the sewer system. Why shouldn't the parties be able
to reach a deal that pleases everyone involved?
Perhaps it is because it would be impossible to create a legal rule
that successfully limits bad bargains without preventing some beneficial bargains, and the harms of exploitative or irresponsible deals between government and individuals might outweigh the benefits of a
few good deals. But this brings us back to the theme of this discussion: what is a bad bargain in the land use context? Are nexus and
proportionality really the best tool to separate the bad from the good?
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MAKING SENSE OF THE JUDICIAL REPUDIATION OF BARGAINING

In fact, taken together, the nexus and proportionality doctrines
stand for the proposition that most potential bargains are bad.
Nexus and proportionality erect a jurisprudential barrier to valuecreating exchange that would lie at the heard of successful negotiated
resolutions to land use conflicts.
The nexus doctrine limits the set of possible municipal-landowner exchanges to those in which the goods of the exchange are related across the medium of prohibitable harm, i.e. directly remedial
measures. In other words, a locality may not trade away its ability to
prevent a harm to extract benefits that it values more than the prevention of said harm. Under nexus, a city cannot bargain away its
discretion to disallow construction of a mall in a residential area in
exchange for the construction of a public pool, or its ability to prevent
the siting of a toxic waste dump in exchange for the construction of
low-income housing. The doctrine of rough proportionality further
limits the set of possible exchanges to strictly proportionate, directly
remedial measures.
These constraints eliminate the vast sources of difference that
give rise to value-creating exchanges. Scholars of negotiation emphasize the importance of considering unrelated goods in formulating options for value-creating exchanges, often noting the proverbial tale of
the two children who fight over an orange. Eventually they split it,
each unhappy to receive only half, and one eats the fruit and throws
away the peel while the other discards the fruit and uses the peel for
baking a cake. 1 70 The moral of the story is that the two could have
negotiated a better outcome by realizing how their interests differed
and then crafting a bargain to exploit that difference.
In a realm of unregulated land use bargaining, differences that
could yield value arise between parties' different resource needs, time
horizons, or risk preferences. A community might indeed prefer tolerating a toxic dump in exchange for low-income housing that it desperately needs, or tolerate nonconforming uses in the short term to
generate a tax base from which to realize desired planning goals in
the future, and some scholars vigorously argue that such exchanges
should be possible. 171 As noted by the authors of Beyond Winning:
Negotiating to Create Value in Deals and Disputes: "the truth is that
differences are often more useful than similarities in helping parties
170. See, e.g.,

RoGER FISHER ET AL., GETTING TO YEs: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT

56-57 (2d ed. 1991).
Cf. Fennell, supra note 40, at 16-27.

WITHOUT GIVING IN

171.
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reach a deal. Differences set the stage for possible gains from trade,
and it is through trades that value is most commonly created." 172
The point is well-framed by Professor Jerold Kayden, who notes the
irony of the facts in Nollan:
A ban on unrelated amenities interferes not only with the preferences of [communities], but potentially with those of property
owners as well. Given the choice between the "unrelated" beach
easement and the "related" viewing spot, for example, the Nollans might very well have selected the beach easement. In the
typical incentive zoning transaction, the developer's choice between related and unrelated amenities would reduce to an economic calculus in which developers, in return for a bonus, would
prefer to provide an inexpensive unrelated amenity rather than
an expensive related one. 173
And according to his analysis, nothing in the Constitution distinguishes the kind of bargaining that the Supreme Court has found acceptable under nexus and proportionality from the unrelated amenity
bargaining it rejects.174
The "nexus and proportionality" barrier to municipal land use
bargaining is controversial for several reasons. As a preliminary
matter, the doctrines pose a striking theoretical repudiation of the
way that most land use dispute resolution takes place. As discussed
above, the bulk of land use planning now occurs in particularized
decisionmaking regarding unique parcels of land, and the decisionmaking process is frequently characterized as one of dealmaking. It
seems unlikely that the Court anticipated the scope of these doctrines' impact without calling more attention to that in its decisions,
raising the possibility that its members had not understood the full
implications of their decision (or more likely, the actual nature of
planning practice). But a jurisprudence that speaks to a system
other than what planners use cannot provide adequate guidance or
constraint. Writing four years before even Nollan was decided, Professor Rose asserts that
the jurisprudence of land decisions is bound to fail unless it
takes account of how these decisions are actually made. Given
the constitutionality of local land use controls, and the likelihood of their continued and even expanded use, such a jurisprudence should attempt to clarify and refine actual practice. This
172. MNOOKIN, ET AL. supra note 6, at 14.
173. Kayden, supra note 58, at 48.
174. Id. at 47-49. This discussion sets aside (for the moment) the problem of how
power imbalances between parties can impact the fairness and results of an unregulated bargaining process, addressed infra, in text accompanying notes 181-82.
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in turn suggests not only an inquiry into local institutional legitimacy, but also a direct approach to the 'dealing' characteristics
of local land controls. 175
That the nexus and proportionality may be speaking to some system
of land use planning other than the one we have lends credence to the
two explanations proposed above for the lack of meaningful change in
planning practice since Dolan. 1 76
Taking the argument one step further, Professor Fennell maintains not only that the Nollan and Dolan rules seem directed to a
model of land use conflict resolution not actually in use, but that they
are theoretically inconsistent with the rest of the regulatory landscape. She argues that the application of nexus and proportionality
to bargains in the exaction context cannot be squared with the thusfar intact authority of municipalities to regulate land use without the
constraints of nexus and proportionality, creating a system fundamentally unfair to landowners and generally bad for communities:
[Nollan and Dolan] require the government to identify and
quantify development-specific negative externalities when it
seeks to obtain a concession of property from a landowner.
However, the Court has not required the underlying land use
regulations-the subject of such bargains-to exhibit a proportionate relationship to the harms they claim to prevent ....
This limitation is understandable; wholesale application of Dolan to regulatory takings jurisprudence would abruptly dismantle nearly seventy-five years of zoning law. Yet Dolan's
proportionality rule, thus limited, represents a logical anomaly.
Land use bargains are constrained by proportionality requirements, while land use decisions made by local governmental
bodies are not.
The result is a conceptual disconnect that has become increasingly
problematic in the years since Nollan and Dolan were decided. The
current state of land use jurisprudence, which couples relatively
open-ended regulatory power with tight restrictions on regulatory
bargains, represents the worst of both worlds. It leaves landowners
exposed to excessive land use regulations while constricting their
ability to bargain for regulatory adjustments. Without meaningful
constraints on the underlying land use regulations, limits on land use
bargains cannot provide landowners with protections against overregulation. Instead, these bargaining limits add insult to injury by
175. Rose, supra note 62, at 847.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 130-31.
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preventing mutually beneficial land use deals and generating vast
inefficiencies that harm landowners and communities. 177
If the Supreme Court intended to level the playing field between
government and property owners, she argues, the new rules only
worsen the imbalance, because they constrain only the flexibility of
the landowner (the government can always set the baseline rules in
whatever array will serve advantageous for future bargains, through
such practices as "downzoning."l78).
Fennel's critique is particularly potent if the Court's true objective in Nollan and Dolan was to protect private property rights
against undue public incursion. If so, their response to this substantive end was a procedural device that, at least according to Fennell,
has backfired. She argues that, although property-rights advocates
have been hoodwinked by the property-rights rhetoric in Dolan, the
decision significantly harms their interests by restricting their rights
to freely alienate. The proscription on bargaining, she warns, ultimately comes down to one less stick in the bundle. 179 Fennell's own
proposal for righting the broken scale is to return private rights to
negotiate within a bargaining model that protects against public exploitation through an in-kind call option (by which landowners would
be permitted non-conforming uses if they can demonstrate reasonable plans to effectively remedy feared externalized harms). 180
But the Supreme Court is not stocked with ill-equipped thinkers.
We may presume that whatever the implications, the justices who
forged the Nollan and Dolan rules saw them as the best means to
their selected end. If it was not to enhance the utility of landowners,
then the Court's support for the nexus and proportionality regime
must stem from a conviction that unconstrained bargaining-even in
the comparatively tame context oftoday's "conditional use permits"is an unsuitable means of conducting good land use planning, presumably because it provides inadequate safeguards against state abdication and exploitation abuses.

177. Fenell, supra note 40, at 4-5.
178. See, e.g., Cordes, supra note 2, at 167 (describing downzoning techniques by
which "undeveloped property is initially heavily restricted with the clear intention of
rezoning the property in response to specific development proposals.").
179. See Fennell, supra note 40, at 50.
180. ld. at 7-8.
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The concern is certainly not unfounded. For example, although
Professor Kayden argues that there is no constitutional basis to prevent unrelated amenity bargaining, he nevertheless worries that allowing it may still prove unsound public policy. 1 B 1 He warns that the
danger of unconstrained bargaining in the land use context is that it
sanctions municipal bribery, enabling "zoning for sale," and may corrupt healthy planning processes. 182 Although unrelated amenity
trades may make a given landowner and bureaucrat feel better off,
they create systemic problems for the community in terms of assuring that the larger public interest is truly served:
The constitutional acceptance of incentive zoning for unrelated
amenities should not obscure the technique's potential shortcomings and the resulting importance of policy guidelines.
Questions of who gains and who loses demand explicit and rigorous examination, especially as the disconnection between an
incentive's burden and an amenity's benefit increases. In order
to make informed judgments about whether to support or oppose the tradeoff between congestion here and low-income housing there, citizens need full disclosure about the nature of the
bargain.
Furthermore, incentive zoning, no less than land policy at
all levels of government, should strive toward ideals of fairness
and equity in its administration. Incentive zoning's burdens and
benefits should be evenly distributed throughout a city in accordance with zoning's bedrock principle of according equal and
uniform treatment to similarly situated landowners. No single
area should bear a disproportionate share of bonus floor area,
nor enjoy a disproportionate share of amenities. 183
(In lay terms, the low-income residents already living next to where
the factory gets built may not be so excited about the municipal bargain that allowed it in exchange for new low-income housing constructed elsewhere.) Kayden's concerns recall the conclusion of
Daniel Pollak that the new rules may contribute a positive "rationalization" of the land use decisionmaking toward what he suggests are
"simply good planning practices."184
Due Process in Municipal Bargaining. If rendered in the language of equal protection, Kayden's essential concern, impliedly
shared by Pollak, is about due process. The problem with unfettered
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Kayden, supra note 58, at 41-44.
Id. at 7.
ld. at 49-50.
PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 75, 34.
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bargaining in land uses is that the excessive reliance on particularized decisionmaking prevents application of the procedural safeguards that normally constrain arbitrary action by state actors.
Zoning laws typically require notice and a hearing before a decision is
made, but they do not require impartiality of decision makers, and
judicial review of zoning decisions applies the minimal scrutiny generally afforded legislative decisions.
Although the decisions of a zoning board are traditionally considered legislative in nature, some states have adopted the position that
the small scale of local zoning authority prevents the deliberation
and logrolling that typically constrain arbitrary decision by larger
legislative bodies, and that zoning decisions should be treated as judicial phenomena. 185 Professor Cordes describes how the special nature of zoning boards renders them immune from the safeguards of
"legislative due process":
[An important] reason for more closely scrutinizing rezoning decisions concerns the nature of local legislative bodies themselves. The normal deference to legislative decisionmaking
processes is premised on a model of government in which undue
influence in decisionmaking is mitigated by the inability of any
one interest group to dominate. This model, based on national
and state legislatures, envisions logrolling and coalition building as a necessary part of the legislative process. Further, this
necessarily involves a protracted process resulting in the forced
deliberation of issues; benefits insured in other contexts by triallike procedures. These features of legislative action are often
viewed as a type of 'legislative due process.'
Commentators have frequently noted that local governing
bodies often lack these features. They are frequently smaller in
size and of a more homogenous character and thus are not
forced to pursue the more compromising and deliberative process indicative of 'higher' legislative bodies. This makes them
more susceptible to the undue influence of personal conflicts
185. See Cordes, supra note 2, at 190-95. Cordes writes: "Although a majority of
jurisdictions still regard rezoning decisions as legislative, a growing minority of
states, supported by substantial academic commentary, now view small-scale rezonings as quasi-judicial and thus subject to basic due process requirements. The leading
case reflecting this trend is Fasano v. Washington County, in which the Oregon Supreme Court held that the rezoning of 32 acres of land was a quasi-judicial act which
required, among other things, provision of procedural safeguards such as impartial
decision makers. In reaching this conclusion, the court emphasized the limited number of parties involved, the small size of the affected parcel, and the pre-existing standards established by the county's comprehensive plan." (Footnotes omitted). Id. at
190-91. See also Kublicki, supra note 4, at 132-34.
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since the process itself is less likely to insulate against the taint
of bias upon the ultimate decision. 1 86
Nevertheless, most zoning boards remain unconstrained by the due
process safeguards that apply to judicial decisions. Can we trust
them to render ad hoc particularized decisions in the public interest?
And like Alice, it seems that we are back to where we started, at
the edge of a cavernous rabbit hole. The critiques of the bargaining
model are compelling, and yet they provide no further elucidation
about how to strike the appropriate balance between public and private interests in land use, and the bargaining model arose as a response to that uncertainty. So, perhaps rather than just eviscerating
bargaining ala nexus and proportionality, which gives rise to inefficiencies and insoluble cumulative impacts problems, perhaps the better approach is to work harder to fix bargaining.
VII.

REPAIRING THE BARGAINING MoDEL: TowARD A
THEORY OF REPRESENTATION

Building a better bargaining model means creating a system that
enables value-creating exchanges that benefit all. The trick is figuring out how to make sure that "all" are truly benefiting.
Protecting the private parties of immediate interest is crucial,
but this seems manageable in a bargaining regime primarily because
they are present at the table. Nevertheless, it is important to constrain the bargaining environment such that municipalities do not
unreasonably establish the initial allocation of rights in favor of the
public interest. For example, abusive deployment of downzoning, by
which "undeveloped property is initially heavily restricted with the
clear intention of rezoning the property in response to specific development proposals," 187 must be curtailed. (Ironically, nexus and proportionality would appear to steer municipalities even closer toward
this practice; Pollak recommends similar practices to municipalities
with still undeveloped land. 1 88)
However, controlling the initial allocation represents a more
traditional bargaining problem: that of the legislative process. On issues of comprehensive planning, as opposed to individual permit negotiations, we should be able to trust the democratic process because
bargaining at that level of scale should involve a sufficiently public
clash of competing values as to force a deliberative procession toward
186. Cordes, supra note 2, at 195.
187. ld. at 167.
188. PoLLAK, supra note 16, at 90-91.
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the correct balance. And where a landowner party to municipal bargaining feels they are beginning with the wrong initial allocation,
then her beef is not with bargaining in the individual case but with
the electoral process that yielded the comprehensive plan. (Her ultimate BATNA: exit. Houston awaits.)
The more challenging problem is how to get the negotiation to
recognize the "all" implied by the public interests in a given land use
conflict. Most of them will not be present at the table.
In some respects, the problems confronting zoning decisionmaking are similar to the problems implicated by negotiated rulemaking
in administrative agencies, a context in which state actors are
charged to render publicly significant outcomes through a bargaining
process. As compared to a zoning dispute, the issues treated in negotiated rulemaking command enormously greater stakes, impacting
vastly more parties than are present at the bargaining table. If we
trust negotiated decisionmaking in that context, who could question
it in the context of a local zoning dispute? However, the bedrock of
negotiated rulemaking legitimacy is its excessive attention to the adequacy of representation at the table. Great pains are taken that all
potentially interested parties are represented at the negotiating table, and if it is feared that the assembled group does not fairly represent the interested public, negotiation will not proceed. 1 B9
Perhaps a bargaining-model of zoning could stand to learn from
negotiated rulemaking in its strict attention to representation. Mter
all, in the absence of the safeguards associated with judicial and
larger-scale legislative processes-and in the absence of rigid bargaining constraints like nexus and proportionality-the only guarantor that the true public interest be served is in representation.
Conceding the real (and at times irreconcilable) tensions between the
competing private and public values at stake in land use disputes,
perhaps what can save the bargaining model of zoning decisionmaking is a better theory of representation.
Scholars of public dispute resolution offer some helpful starting
points for the inquiry.
As discussed above, Professor Rose proposes mediation as the
best theoretical model for legitimizing local land use planning decisionmaking, and offers concepts of "exit" and "voice" as means of providing necessary representational constraints. 190 She argues that in
189. See oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71; cf. Freeman &
Langbein, supra note 100, at 73-75, 83 (describing the inclusive participation protocols for negotiated rulemaking).
190. Rose, supra note 62, at 890-92.
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local arenas, where constraints founded on separation-of-powers concepts are ill-fitted to the scale of operations, legitimacy can be harvested through mediative processes that ensure meaningful
participation (voice) for interested parties and recognize the parties'
ultimate BATNA-that of leaving the bargaining table (exit). But as
compelling as is her recognition that unconstrained land use bargaining may best be harnessed as mediation, Rose's proposition that voice
and exit can salvage and legitimate the bargaining model is unpersuasive in most contexts. In other than very small communities,
voice is difficult to ensure (absent the still-missing theory of representation), and in most localities-especially small communitiesexit is an unlikely, and accordingly hollow threat.
Professor Menkel-Meadow has also considered the question of
how deliberative democratic processes can take account of representation issues in public problem-solving contexts where negotiationbased processes are relied on in the absence of a shared substantive
concept of the good. 191 Turning to Jurgen Habermas's political theory for inspiration, she proposes as a governing procedural model the
"discourse principle," according to which outcomes are legitimate "if
and only if all possibly affected persons could agree to them as participants in rational discourse." 192 Menkel-Meadow adopts the discourse principle subject to the additional substantive requirement
that inequality of power and resources not distort decisionmaking or
coerce deliberation.l 93 She recognizes, however, the problem of how
this theory can take account of representation in contexts where individual participation is impossible:
[T]o the extent that participation remains a cornerstone of democratic theory, new forms of participation (whether direct or mediated by agents or representatives) may require the creation of
new institutions or modifications of old forms to permit optimum and appropriate levels of participation for effective and legitimate outcomes. 1 94
(Unfortunately, this in-progress piece stops short of proposing a
solution.)
The literature reveals few novel proposals for managing the tensions of land use bargaining with reference to the representation
problem, but two proposals falling at either end of the legalistic/market-model spectrum of decisionmaking bear mentioning. At the free
191.
192.
193.
194.

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 63, at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id.
Id. at 9.
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market end, Professor Fennel proposes that private and public interests could be protected in a bargaining framework by the adaptation
of a liability-based in-kind call option, which would allow landowners
free disposition of their property so long as they effectively remedy
harms to identified public values. Her proposal is not specifically oriented toward solving the representation problem, but offers protection for interested parties through the market method of vetopurchasing:
The centerpiece of [the proposed] approach is a mechanism that
amounts to an in-kind 'call option'-a species of liability rule
that would permit landowners to engage in otherwise forbidden
land uses by providing in-kind remediation of cognizable negative externalities. Although the idea of using liability rules to
regulate land use is not new, my approach differs from the standard liability rules in that it focuses on the in-kind remediation
of externalities rather than the payment of monetary damages.
This in-kind call option would place a ceiling on the permissible
bargaining range while leaving landowners and governmental
entities free to pursue more efficient alternatives without regard to the Nollan/ Dolan limitations. The call option would itself be alienable as well, allowing communities to effectively buy
veto rights with respect to development on a given parcel of
land. This framework would provide a coherent mechanism for
blocking unconstitutional takings without also blocking socially
beneficial bargains. 1 95
Fennell's model deals well with the problem of government overreaching and exploitation oflandowners, but neglects the problems of
zoning authority capture by interest groups and abdication of governmental responsibility. Additionally, although the market framework
provides an attractively predictable model of stakeholder behavior, it
weakens protections for Kayden's marginalized community members
that may have difficulty protecting interests easily compromised in
the bargaining process (especially in the realm of raising "cognizable"
objections to a proposed use and its corresponding remedy). Needless
to say, marginalized groups are unlikely to be able to purchase vetoentitlements. Finally, in promoting the market sale of entitlements,
Fennell's proposal risks steering development of the bargaining process away from the more promising consensus-based mediation
model advocated by Professor Rose.
At the other end of the spectrum is a proposal by a pair of New
Jersey judges that localities enact "fairness hearings" at which a
195.

Fennell, supra note 40, at 7-8.
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judge can assess a proposed settlement's reasonableness and fairness
to all interested parties.196 They observe that such hearings have
been advocated in various "public law" contexts due to the salutary
effect that neutral review provides for the interests of absent third
parties. 197 According to this proposal,
A fairness hearing would be similar to the public hearings held
prior to board action. The applicant and/or municipal agency
involved could explain the settlement and the basis for its support. Members of the public could comment for or against the
settlement. [It is] essential that members of the public be given
notice and an opportunity to be heard. A fairness hearing, affording limited intervention to present arguments or to appeal
an approved settlement, seeks to balance competing concerns.
Intervention is permitted, but only to determine the settlement's fairness, not to allow the intervener to compel a full adjudication of the case's merits. 198
The fairness hearing appropriately attends to the problem of absent
third parties, but it presumes an adversarial nature in the settlement
context that may not accurately characterize the relationships at
play in the bargaining model except in the most controversial contexts. Although this model would work well where a proposed settlement is notorious within a community, it may require more
participation from interested third parties than is realistic, especially
when bargaining has proceeded smoothly. Most problematically, this
judicially-modeled proposal presumes that a judge hearing only a
fraction of the exchange that gave rise to a negotiated outcome can
adequately represent the interests of absent parties that he or she
may know little about. A significant value of the mediation model of
bargaining is that parties present over the course of the negotiation
experience "learning" benefits that enable them to better understand
the conflicting interests and values at play.1 99
But rather than entrusting the representation of absent third
parties' interests to a purposefully shielded authority figure for vindication after the negotiation process is over, perhaps the better solution is to entrust their representation to a designated member of the
negotiating team distinct from the rest of the zoning board.
This person could be deputized with the special obligation of representing the interests of vulnerable absentee parties as distinct from
196. Cohen et al., supra note 17, at 864-65.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Cf. Freeman & Langbein, supra note 100, at 80-81.
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the rest of the zoning board, which is charged with the representation
of the general public interest. This third-party deputy would acquire
sufficient knowledge of the absent parties' needs and interests as to
make them part of the negotiation, such that the primary parties can
be confronted with them during the "learning" phases of the process.
(Ideally, where possible, the deputy could also convey the learning
benefits she gains through the negotiation to the interested third parties.) Furthermore, if adequately insulated from the zoning board (in
the style of an ombudsman), the third-party deputy could maintain
vigilance against capture, or even exploitation of present party landowners based on the regulatory expertise she would develop in her
professional role.
The involvement of a third-party deputy might enable the development of a zoning mediation process that could approach the utility
of Susskind's negotiated rulemaking model, where the public interest
is successfully pursued through learning-based consensus.2oo Ultimately, a third-party deputy would also be subject to capture-potentially, and perhaps most disarmingly, by the zoning board itself. The
same representation critiques that apply in other arenas would likely
apply in this one, since a proxy can never seamlessly translate another individual's preferences, nor fully convey procedural learning
benefits to the principal. But representational flaws associated with
the deputy are no more daunting than the flaws associated with the
status quo and they are arguably less so. Until Professor MenkelMeadow delivers a welcome (!) theory of representation in deliberative democracy, perhaps this is the best means of preserving the bargaining model dominant in land use planning while protecting the
public interests most likely to be sacrificed therein.

VIII.

CoNCLUSION

This article has sought to demonstrate how modern land use
planning is fundamentally an exercise in bargaining, and how recent
movements in the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence would dismantle that system. It concludes that while there is merit to the
Court's concerns about impermissible bargaining, the constraints it
has crafted through nexus and proportionality are ill wed to the actual nature of the process it seeks to govern. Nexus and proportionality provide helpful indications of good planning decisions in many
cases, but may needlessly prevent beneficial solutions to real
200. See id. at 110-13 (discussing the learning and consensus benefits of negotiated rulemaking); oral communication with Susskind, supra note 71.
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problems in land use planning for which the doctrines fail to provide
even the possibility of solution, such as the cumulative impacts
problem.
Nevertheless, unfettered bargaining poses real risks that outcomes will fail to vindicate the correct balance between public and
private interests in land use within communities. But the real problem may lie in the impossibility of reaching consensus on where that
balance should rest. Until that occurs, procedural protection for all
parties in the form of adequate representation is the best remedy.
One means of accomplishing this may be the appointment of a thirdparty deputy to represent absent third parties in a mediation-oriented bargaining process.

